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1. Introduction
The constitutional identity of  States does not only present a conflictual slope, 
as the one that derives from considering it as “counter-limit”, but it can also operate 
in relations of  confluence,1 as it is shown by the Court of  Justice of  the European 
Union (CJEU) which incorporated internal constitutional law, while acknowledging its 
particularities, in the modulation of  the application of  European law.  
What is at stake is the judicial application of  the concept of  identity, at the 
European level, that corresponds to the one that at the internal level, entails the 
possible integration of  European law within the parameter of  constitutionality.2 The 
constitutional identity term is used here in a broad or extensive sense to refer to the 
particularities of  the constitutional systems of  the States that are not necessarily part 
of  the national identity in a strict sense, as essential or hard core, of  the constitutional 
order. However, bearing in mind, and in that strict sense, that the national identity is 
a concept ‘of  border’ that poses probably unsurmountable concretization problems 
and difficulties to take it operative as a legal concept judicially applicable, this other 
‘improper’ dimension of  national identity may fulfil it with content inserting it in a 
normalized relation of  confluence among legal systems that deactivates the disruptive 
political potential of  the European integration. 
In any case, it is necessary to inform that overcoming the relation problems of  
the European legal system and the internal constitutional systems depends upon the 
existence of  an authentic Constitution (unlike the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, not even the Treaty of  Lisbon) that makes possible the articulation of  an 
European constitutional system in which the secondary constitutional systems, the ones 
of  Member States, are fully integrated. Notwithstanding the fact that the European 
Union did not reach that primary constitutional level yet and it will neither achieve it 
with the Treaty of  Lisbon, and even not knowing if  it will take that step in a near future. 
One could wonder nonetheless, that the result would only be achieved in a limited 
manner, in the sense that the international constitutional European community will 
be, for a long time, a very plural community, and conditioned by strong asymmetries, 
which in turn will result in the impossibility of  overcoming the constitutional tension in 
favour of  the European dimension. 
The difficulties posed in the current situation of  the relations between internal 
and European do no emerge only from the non-primary nature of  the European legal 
system. The debacle is, given the development of  the European integration, not only 
that the European system is not primary, because it did not achieve that condition yet, 
but the internal system is not primary neither because of  the increasing legal-political 
interdependence (not to mention economic) of  the European system. We are therefore, 
faced with a transition period in which the internal legal systems lost their condition 
of  primary legal systems (although they can recover it by triggering Article 50 TEU, as 
1 As pointed-out by A. Schillaci, the counter-limits may be nor only instruments of  defence of  the 
internal constitutional order but also “instruments of  openness and mechanisms of  material integration”, in 
such a manner that “the reserves of  constitutionality, until now identified as moments of  relentless opposition, and 
internal aporia of  the relations between systems end up becoming an instrument of  guarantee and mechanisms of  
representation of  the specific demands of  each community”. See A. Schillaci, “Caminos de la integración material: 
la comunitarización de los contralímites en la Decisión Sociéte Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine del Conseil d’Etat”, 
in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, No. 8, July-December 2007, http://www.ugr.
es/~redce/REDCE8/articulos/12AngeloSchillaci.htm
2 See my essay “Primato del diritto europeo e identità costituzionale nell’esperienza spagnola”, in the 
press in Italy.
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was the case with the United Kingdom following Brexit) and the European legal system 
did not acquire it yet. This period of  transition sparks some of  the legal problems that 
we face in the relations among the European legal system and the internal legal ones.   
The key peculiarity of  this articulation between internal and European systems 
in this transition period does not entail, however, relation problems that are, in fact, 
perfectly normal. The difficulties do not emerge from the existence of  conflicts (that 
are inherent to the systems regardless of  what type of  system they are) but rather 
from the lack of  cross-cutting rules, techniques and mechanisms that may overcome 
those conflicts in a satisfactory fashion for both parties. However, the absence of  those 
rules cannot be addressed (at least considering the constitutional experience gathered 
so far) as long as this transition period is in place and the European legal system awaits 
shaping as a primary constitutional system from which the legal-constitution systems 
of  Member States derive their legitimacy from (secondary therefore). Only then the 
always hard articulation between the European legal system and the internal ones can 
be pacified. 
In the current state of  affairs, one can only talk about the absence of  rules 
that allow for the resolution of  conflicts at the constitutional level since at the infra-
constitutional level, those rules exist and were accepted by mainly all Member States. At 
the Constitutional level, however, the tension is unavoidable since the European Union 
did not incorporate, in its plenitude and in all its aspects, the European constitutional 
patrimony, namely pluralist democracy as well as the social dimension that – even if  in an 
increasing formal configuration – it is still a structural element of  that same patrimony. 
2. The European constitutional identity in the internal dialectics 
of  the European Constitutional Law
The dialectic relation among the European legal system and the internal ones 
does not reveal a conflictual profile through the counter-limits or the constitutional 
reservations that define a constitutional identity before European Law. One could 
say that that conflictual slope has meaning if  the European Union acts outside the 
axiological frontiers of  the European constitutional patrimony, this is beyond the 
constitutional identity defined by the European Constitutional Law.  In this transition 
period, in which the EU does not have but a constitutional density analogous to  those 
of  Member States, that identity cannot only be the one of  the European Constitutional 
Law in a narrow sense (the EU one) but rather in a broad sense (from the various 
constitutional spaces living side by side in the European space).3
When the dialectic relation between internal constitutional law and European law, 
it is within the margins of  the European Constitutional Law (in a broad sense) and 
within the framework of  a common and shared4 constitutional culture. It acquires a 
distinct nature, which is no longer conflictual but integrational and complementary. One 
must, therefore, on one side, differentiate the possible collision between European law 
and internal constitutional law and, on the other, the eventual integration of  European 
3 About this disctinction, my work “Perfis metodológicos do Direito Constitucional Europeu”, in 
O constitucionalismo do séc. XXI na sua dimensão estadual, supranacional e global, Vasco Pereira da Silva y 
Francisco Balaguer Callejón (coords.), (Lisboa:Instituto de Ciências Jurídico-Políticas da Faculdade 
de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa, 2015) 19-20. 
4 In similar terms to what Peter Häberle would define as the “European common constitutional law”. 
See P. Häberle, “Gemeineuropäisches Verfassungsrecht”, EuGRZ (1991), Spanish version by Emilio 
Mikunda, “Derecho constitucional común europeo”, No. 79, REP (1993). 
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Union law in the internal parameter of  constitutionality. This does not represent a 
conflict between that parameter and constitutional law but, their confluence to determine 
the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of  infra-constitutional law. 
The ordinary perception regarding constitutional control is the direct contrast 
between an infra-constitutional norm and a constitutional one. This contrast may 
determine itself  the unconstitutionality of  the norm that was the object of  constitutional 
control in a way that the parameter of  constitutionality may be only composed by 
constitutional norms. This perception results incomplete, however, since to the 
direct control one can add the designated control which happens when, following the 
constitutional norms, one must integrate the parameter of  constitutionality of  infra-
constitutional norms (the so called “brought norms” according to Italian doctrine) that 
have the same value of  the ones that will be controlled. This set of  norms integrates 
the so-called “constitutional block” in Spain5 and shall be object of  consideration by the 
public powers when, through these rules, at stake is the attribution of  competences or 
proceedings that determine its legal production. 
Notwithstanding the manifest heterogeneity in the possible content of  the 
constitutionality block means there is a common element to all possible prerequisites: 
the one that relates to the condition of  the norms on legal production that integrate, 
and through which we can determine the validity of  other norms, that have the same 
value nonetheless. There is not necessarily a legal hierarchy between the parametric 
norms and the controlled ones. On the contrary, it is the competencies principle the 
ultima ratio justification of  this function: these are norms that enable or modulate 
competencies (normative faculties) attributed to certain organisms. They carry out, 
therefore, the material constitutional function,6 the one of  regulating the processes 
of  legal production. The material function, however, that does not reflect its complex 
position within the system of  sources of  law. 
The constitutional block presents positive aspects regarding the flexibility with 
which it enables the legal system, particularly in a situation where there is a plurality of  
systems. The conflicts among legal systems shall be solved in line with the competencies 
criteria that may be adjusted considering the diversity of  infra-constitutional norms that 
integrate the parameter of  constitutionality. From that perspective, the constitutional 
block presupposes a certain openness to the constitutional necessities at the legislative 
level and in the relations among the territorial powers. 
In what concerns European law, the problem arises whether the European norms 
may also be part of  the constitutional block or, in a broader sense, in the parameter 
of  constitutionality. The Spanish Constitutional Court responded negatively to this 
question by considering that European law is not part of  the constitutional block and 
cannot be incorporated into the parameter of  constitutionality. The Court followed 
a cautious jurisprudential line to avoid being faced with questions arising from the 
application of  European law. For that end, it conferred infra-constitutional character to 
these types of  questions when, in fact, they have a constitutional nature considering that 
any violation of  valid European law implies, necessarily, the violation of  the legal basis 
5 In Spain, this concept applies to the relations between the State’s legal system and the regional 
ones, as prescribed by Article 28, recital 1, LOTC: «Para apreciar la conformidad o disconformidad con 
la Constitución de una Ley, disposición o acto con fuerza de Ley del Estado o de las Comunidades Autónomas, 
el Tribunal considerará, además de los preceptos constitucionales, las Leyes que, dentro del marco constitucional , se 
hubieran dictado para delimitar las competencias del Estado y las diferentes Comunidades Autónomas o para regular 
o armonizar el ejercicio de las competencias de éstas». 
6 See F. Rubio Llorente, “El bloque de constitucionalidad”, in REDC, n. 27 (1989), 25.
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prescribed by Article 93 of  the Spanish Constitution (SC), which opens the internal 
legal system to European Law.7 
Now, this constitutional nature, resulting from Article 93 SC, does not require 
that it is the Constitutional Court to intervene in the resolution of  conflicts between 
European law and internal law (albeit that intervention may take place when a lesion of  
other constitutional norms occurs: see the Spanish Constitutional Court’s Judgments 
SSTC 58/2004 and 194/2006). That intervention would only be necessary if  the 
relations between both legal systems were governed by a principle of  hierarchy that 
would determine the nullity of  internal norms that were in contradiction with European 
ones. However, the principle of  primacy of  EU law implies only putting aside the 
internal norm and the application of  the European preferential: what is at stake is a 
matter of  efficiency and not one of  normative validity, which must be dealt with by the 
ordinary judge.
Beyond these technical questions, it is certain – despite the doctrine of  the Spanish 
Constitutional Court – that EU law is integrated in the Spanish legal system and this 
triggers an interaction between it and the European one, which will impact on the 
constitutional level as well. This incidence will progressively increase in close relation 
with the intensification of  the integration process and to deny the problem – as the 
Spanish Constitutional Court does – will not help to put forward a solution and neither 
to control its effects.  
An important novelty in relation to the possible integration of  European law in 
the parameter of  constitutionality is the Judgment of  the Spanish Constitutional Court 
86/2011, 9 of  July, in which the Full Court referred three questions for preliminary 
ruling that would be answered by the CJEU in the Melloni’s Judgment (Case C-399/11). 
The Spanish Constitutional Court acknowledged that European Law can integrate the 
canon of  constitutionality, by highlighting in point FJ4.B) that: “regarding the appeal this 
Court faces a problem for which solution largely depends on the interpretation and validity of  the 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI, from the Council, 13 of  June, as well as on the interpretation 
of  Article 53 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (CFREU) and 
the consequences that result from that norm”, since the “parameter of  control that we shall 
apply (…) must be integrated, among others, from the rules of  EU law that protect 
the correspondent fundamental rights as well as the ones that regulate the European 
Arrest Warrant”. It was predictable, therefore, that a substantive overturn of  the 
doctrine followed until now. It was not the case, however, as the Judgement 26/2014, 
13 of  February 2014, shows the when answering the main question in the proceedings, 
arguing that European law is to be considered as interpretative criteria, leads us to 
Article 10 paragraph 2 SC and not to the direct applicability of  EU law as part of  the 
parameter of  constitutionality.
3. National Constitutional identity and relations of  confluence 
of  the European validity parameter
In the same way that European constitutional law may be linked to the 
constitutional level of  internal law incorporating itself  in the parameter of  
7 According to Article 93 SC: “Mediante ley orgánica se podrá autorizar la celebración de tratados por los que 
se atribuya a una organización o institución internacional el ejercicio de competencias derivadas de la Constitución. 
Corresponde a las Cortes Generales o al Gobierno, según los casos, la garantía del cumplimiento de estos tratados y de 
las resoluciones emanadas de los organismos internacionales o supranacionales titulares de la cesión”. 
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constitutionality, - and limiting the decisions of  the Constitutional Court that must 
decide upon the validity of  internal norms –,  internal constitutional law has developed 
an analogue function regarding the activity of  the CJEU. This is the consequence 
of  the incorporation of  Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU concerning the respect of  the 
Constitutional identities of  the Member States. It is, however, undeniable that this 
version of  “constitutional identity” has very little to do with idea of  “counter-limits”, i.e., 
with the existence of  an essential core of  the internal constitutional system that could 
not be touched by European law.
On the contrary, what is at stake is a similar mechanism to the “margin of  appreciation” 
that appeals to the constitutional identity “with lowercase letter”, as Pedro Cruz Villalón 
affirms, which entails the loss of  its absolute character.  Thereby, “the constitutional identity 
may be invoked, with very limited reservations, by the Member States, with the cost of  having to 
compete with a plurality of  categories and, in particular with a proportionality assessment”.8 As Stelio 
Mangiameli maintains; “the limitations imposed to the application of  some European law rules are 
a consequence of  the systematic interpretation of  the supranational law itself, in relation to which the 
norms from the national Constitutions are assumed not by their normative reach but as a part of  the 
relevant facts for the application of  European principles, even when those correspond in terms of  content 
to concepts used by the national constitutional norms”.9 
We could therefore, affirm that the CJEU does not apply the counter-limits 
here as such, not even in a “Europeanised” slope because, in fact, it does not define 
the constitutional identity as such, but only to what extent certain particularities of  
the constitutional system might module the application of  European law. These 
particularities are, necessarily, an integral part of  the “constitutional identity” is more than 
debatable. This does not mean that they may not be so (for example, in the case of  the 
principle of  human dignity, in Germany) but that that condition is not relevant for the 
CJEU since, even if  they were not part of  the “constitutional identity”, they could be used 
to modulate the application of  the principle of  primacy. 
In the Judgment Omega, the CJEU recalls the “margin of  appreciation”, saying 
that the competent national authorities must decide within the limits imposed by the 
Treaties when there is an exception to public order capable of  justifying restriction on 
the freedom to provide services since “the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the 
concept of  public policy may vary from one country to another and from one era to another”.10/11 From 
this perspective, the question is solved integrally within the framework of  European 
law since, as the Court states; “there can therefore be no doubt that the objective of  protecting 
human dignity is compatible with Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, 
8 See P. Cruz Villalón, “La identidad constitucional de los Estados miembros: dos relatos europeos”, 
in Scritti in onore di Antonio D’Atena, (Roma: Giuffrè Editore, 2015), Tomo I, 739, 742. See also, A. 
Ruggeri, “Primato del diritto sovranazionale versus identità costituzionale? (Alla ricerca dell’araba 
fenice costituzionale: i “controlimiti”)”: www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/.../
ruggeri.pdf  and S. Gambino, “Identidad constitucional nacional, derechos fundamentales e 
integración europea” in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, No. 18, Julio-Diciembre (2012): 
http://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE18/articulos/02_GAMBINO.htm. 
9 S. Mangiameli, “L’Unione Europea e l’identità degli Stati membri”, in Scritti in onore di Antonio 
D’Atena, Tomo III, Giuffrè Editore (2015) 1839.
10 This is so, although the CJEU acknowledges also that “according to the referring court, the prohibition 
on the commercial exploitation of  games involving the simulation of  acts of  violence against persons, in particular 
the representation of  acts of  homicide, corresponds to the level of  protection of  human dignity which the national 
constitution seeks to guarantee in the territory of  the Federal Republic of  Germany”. (Recital 39, Judgment 
Omega, Case C-36/02, 2004). 
11 Judgment Omega, Case C-36/02, 2004, recital 31. 
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the principle of  respect for human dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental 
right”.12/13 We shall remind that the Judgment Omega was issued in 2004 and the Treaty 
of  Lisbon was not into force yet, and therefore the clear recognition of  the principle of  
constitutional identity, pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU, was neither so.14 
The CJEU decision in Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein from 2010, is subsequent to the 
entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the Austrian government argues its 
constitutional identity precisely, saying; “that the provisions at issue in the main proceedings 
are intended to protect the constitutional identity of  the Republic of  Austria”.15 This mention is 
made, however, in a peculiar manner since it recognizes that it is not an element of  
the republican principle but a pretension to guarantee the formal equality. The CJEU 
acknowledges that “in the context of  Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the abolition 
of  the nobility, as an element of  national identity, may be taken into consideration when a balance is 
struck between legitimate interests and the right of  free movement of  persons recognised under European 
Union law”,16 wherefore “the justification relied upon by the Austrian Government by reference to 
the Austrian constitutional situation is to be interpreted as reliance on public policy”.17
The reasoning of  the CJEU, after insisting on the idea that the competent national 
authorities shall have a “margin of  appreciation”, is sufficient evidence to decide, within 
the limits set out by the Treaty, whenever there is an exception of  public order, resorting 
to the key question of  equality, the one that permits the resolution of  a problem in the 
way that the Court does, even when invoking the constitutional identity norm, Article 
4 paragraph 2 TEU. In the context of  the main proceedings, the Austrian Government 
has stated that the Law on the abolition of  the nobility constitutes implementation 
of  the more general principle of  equality before the law of  all Austrian citizens. 
The European Union’s legal system undeniably seeks to ensure the observance of  
the principle of  equal treatment as a general principle of  law. That principle is also 
enshrined in Article 20 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights. “There can therefore, be 
no doubt that the objective of  observing the principle of  equal treatment is compatible with European 
Union law”.18 Finally, “it does not appear disproportionate for a Member State to seek to attain the 
objective of  protecting the principle of  equal treatment by prohibiting any acquisition, possession or use, 
by its nationals, of  titles of  nobility or noble elements which may create the impression that the bearer 
of  the name is holder of  such a rank”.19
Lastly, in Comission v. Spain, Case C-151/12, 24 October 2013, the CJEU made 
reference to a relationship mechanism between the State’s legal system and the regional 
ones when, in fact, that mechanism is not definitely part of  the Spanish constitutional 
identity, as the rule on the subsidiary nature of  the State law regarding regional law. 
12 See on Judgment Omega, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, “Derechos fundamentales y libertades de circulación 
a la sombra de una Constitución para Europa: Comentario a la Sentencia TJCE (Sala 1.ª), de 14 de 
octubre de 2004 (Asunto C-36/02: “Omega”)”, in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, No. 5, 
January-June  2006, http://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE5/articulos/14sixtosanchezlorenzo.htm 
13 Judgment Omega, Case C-36/02, 2004, recital 34.
14 This is so, although the CJEU acknowledges also that “according to the referring court, the prohibition 
on the commercial exploitation of  games involving the simulation of  acts of  violence against persons, in particular the 
representation of  acts of  homicide, corresponds to the level of  protection of  human dignity which the national constitution 
seeks to guarantee in the territory of  the Federal Republic of  Germany” (Recital 39, Judgment Omega, Case 
C-36/02, 2004).
15 Judgment Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein, Case C-208/09, 2010, recital 74.
16 Idem, recital 83. 
17 Ibidem, recital 84. 
18 Ibidem, recital 88 and 89.
19  Ibidem, recital 93.
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Moreover, the CJEU analysis of  the interpretation to be given by Spain to this clause, 
using a correct criteria, in our view, is based on the case law of  the Spanish Constitutional 
Court: “it must be noted that, in accordance with the case-law of  the Tribunal Constitucional 
(Constitutional Court), which the Kingdom of  Spain cites in its observations, Article 149(3) of  the 
Constitution does not appear to permit the application of  national rules in a supplementing manner 
in the absence of  legislation by the Autonomous Communities, but only to fill identified gaps. It is 
appropriate to add that, at the hearing, the Kingdom of  Spain confirmed that, in the present case, 
the Autonomous Communities, with the exception of  the Autonomous Community of  Catalonia, 
have not exercised their legislative powers. In those circumstances, the application of  the supplementing 
clause in the present case would not be appropriate as regards the intracommunal river basins outside 
Catalonia”.20
In fact, in this case, Spain invoked Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU combined with 
Article 288 TFEU to reproach the Commission for trying to impose the way in which 
the Directive should be transposed, since it understood that the subsidiarity clause of  
the State law, in the terms of  Article 149º paragraph 3 of  the Spanish Constitution, 
was enough to ensure the application of  European law. Thus, here it is not the case 
of  any matter of  constitutional identity as it was the case in the various proceedings 
mentioned before. However, the important aspect of  this case-law from the CJEU is 
the integration of  the concept of  constitutional identity itself  (even if  in an “improper” 
fashion) and, therefore, the integration of  internal constitutional norms in the parameter 
mobilized to assess its validity, even if  those are not exactly part of  the constitutional 
identity of  States. This way, a confluence between constitutional law and European law 
to assess validity questions regarding norms that take place also at the internal level 
occurs by means of  the possible integration of  the European law in the parameter of  
constitutionality.   
The dialectic relation between the national constitutional identity and the European 
one acquires, therefore, a double perspective. On one side, the incorporation of  
European law in the internal parameter of  constitutionality, contributes to reconfigure 
the “national constitutional identity” in a broader sense. On the other, the function that 
state constitutional law (the national constitutional identity in a broad sense) plays in 
modulating the application of  European law contributes to reconfigure the specific 
European constitutional identity of  the Union, since it defines its possibilities, its limits 
and its developing lines, in the confrontation of  the national constitutional law. 
4. The national constitutional identity and its conflictual 
dimension
In what concerns the relations of  conflict between European law and internal 
law, one must acknowledge that the primacy of  EU law does not refrain before internal 
constitutional law. It does not differentiate, to this end, the distinct levels of  State 
law. Moreover, it does not comprehend, even, mechanisms that make possible, in the 
internal order, to conceal the observance of  European law with the constitutional law 
demands that require a specific revision mechanism to modify the constitutional norms 
which are contradictory with the due immediacy of  the application of  European law. 
The normativity of  the Constitution is the result of  a long and hard historical 
process that was a much-desired outcome by the European nations, and so is the 
European integration process, because it facilitates the establishment of  a peaceful and 
20 Judgment Comission v. Spain, Case C-151/12, 2013, recital 35. 
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orderly co-existence that respects pluralism and guarantees the fulfilment of  rights 
and liberties. It is not difficult to understand, from that perspective, the perplexity 
with which both constitutionalists and citizens follow a process that, since it did not 
reach its highest development phase, relativizes, and puts in question the normativity 
of  the Constitution, without offering a proper constitutional system in which the 
constitutional feeling of  European citizens can be deposited and that answers to the 
same pleas that the internal systems are faced with today. 
This perplexity is shared by the constitutional courts of  Member States, 
namely the Spanish Constitutional Court, that fulfilling its obligation of  the ultimate 
guarantor of  the Constitution, clearly established the principle according to which the 
application of  European law cannot be done against Constitutional norms, because 
the European integration does not diminish the binding of  public powers to the 
Constitution. The doctrine is very clear on this point. In STC 64/1991, it is expressly 
highlighted that21 “the concession of  the exercise of  competences in favour of  supranational 
entities does not imply that the internal authorities are no longer abided by the internal legal system, 
when they act in the fulfilment of  obligations resulting from those entities, since in these cases what 
is at stake is also public power that is therefore subject to the Constitution and to the Spanish legal 
system (Article 9 paragraph 1 Spanish Constitution)”. This general principle presupposes 
that all the procedural rules linked to constitutional proceedings connected to the 
action of  Spanish public powers are open, even when these actions are necessary or 
derive from the application of  european law.22 
In the Spanish constitutional jurisprudence, the question of  the possible 
constitutional conflict was raised again, on the occasion of  the ratification process 
of  the Draft Constitutional Treaty, due to the express recognition of  the principle 
of  primacy that was made by Article I-6 in which “[t]he Constitution and law adopted by 
the institutions of  the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the 
law of  the Member States.” This norm, withdrawn with the Treaty of  Lisbon (since the 
principle of  primacy is now enshrined in the Declaration No 17 annexed to the Final 
Act of  the Lisbon Treaty IGC), had raised concerns with its possible contradiction with 
Article 9 paragraph 1 Spanish Constitution (“Citizens and public authorities are bound by the 
Constitution and all other legal provisions”). This question was raised by the Council of  State 
in its diktat on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, suggesting that the 
Government would use the mechanism, via Article 9 paragraph 5 Spanish Constitution, 
to initiate proceedings to assess the constitutionality of  this Treaty before the Spanish 
Constitutional Court. The Court replied to that request with the Declaration 1/2004, 
December 13, stating that there was not any contradiction between the Spanish 
Constitution and the Draft Constitutional Treaty.
The Court keeps in line, with this Declaration and with the previous doctrine, 
in the sense that the possible contradiction between European law and the Spanish 
Constitution would force a ruling from the Court: “In the unlikely case that the ulterior 
dynamics of  EU law would lead to make this branch of  law irreconcilable with the Spanish 
Constitution, – without the hypothetical excesses of   European law in relation to its own (European) 
21 Judgment STC 64/1991, Spanish Constitutional Court, [FJ 4.b)].
22 Judgment STC 64/1991, Spanish Constitutional Court, FJ 4.a), the court indicates such 
concerning the writ of  amparo: «es claro también que, en la medida en que se impugne en amparo un acto del 
poder público que, habiendo sido dictado en ejecución del Derecho comunitario europeo, pudiera lesionar un derecho 
fundamental, el conocimiento de tal pretensión corresponde a esta jurisdicción constitucional, con independencia de si 
aquel acto es o no regular desde la estricta perspectiva del ordenamiento comunitario europeo, y sin perjuicio del valor 
que éste tenga a los efectos de lo dispuesto en el artículo 10.2 SC». 
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Constitution being dealt by ordinary mechanisms there enshrined –  the conservation of  the sovereignty 
of  the Spanish people and the supremacy of  the Constitution could lead  this Court to approach the 
problems that from that case could arise, and that from the current perspective are inexistent, through 
the relevant constitutional mechanisms; furthermore, the protection of  the said sovereignty is safeguarded 
by Article I-60 of  the Treaty, a true counterpoint to Article I-6, permitting to define its real dimension: 
the primacy proclaimed in Article I-6 is incapable of  surmounting the  possibility of  withdrawal that 
it is reserved to the sovereign, supreme will of  Member States”.23 
The Europeanisation of  the counter limits by Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU, 
modified by the Treaty of  Lisbon, implies the recognition by the Union of  the existence 
of  a constitutional core integrated by the fundamental political and constitutional 
structures of  the Member States that must be preserved. The ground for a latent 
conflict in the constitutional front between the Member States and the European 
Union, that suggests the possible relativism of  the principle of  primacy, is now open. 
It is not, however, a question free from issues, since the proper existence of  the 
Union as an autonomous legal system is dependent on the principle of  primacy. For 
that reason, the constitutional conflict still lacks an easy solution. On the other hand, 
in order for that conflict to occur, is necessary that the conditions that could justify 
it take place, which is not the case in the first decision issued by a constitutional 
court of  a Member State (Constitutional Court of  the Czech-Republic, 31 January 
2012) that ruled a legal act from a European entity ultra vires, by considering that the 
previous ruling of  the CJEU (Judgment Landtová, Case C-399/09, 22 June 2011) 
went beyond the competences transferred to the EU by the scope of  Article 10.a) of  
the Czech Constitution. 
It is in any case evident that what we face here it is a possible contradiction that, 
until now, has no solution through the mechanisms established so far to articulate 
the European and internal systems. This contradiction is unsurmountable due to the 
transition period that the European integration process currently faces and until the 
creation of  a Constitution of  the Union to which the constitutional norms of  the 
Member States are subject to. Despite the advance that the Treaty of  Lisbon enshrines 
the configuration of  the European constitutional law as “supreme law”, proper of  a 
Federal system, remains. In this future phase, it will not be possible to oppose the 
unconstitutionality of  European law to the internal Constitution because the internal 
constitutional courts will be European tribunals as well and, therefore, will have the 
obligation to apply first the European Constitution over the internal one. There will 
be a “stronger linkage”, in the terms defined by North-American federalism, between 
the internal constitutional courts and the European constitutional system, stronger 
than the one that exists in relation to the internal constitutional system.
In any way, as we could gather so far, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
conflictual dimension and the dimension of  confluence of  constitutional identity, 
both being able to be framed within the scope of  Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU. The 
first do with the counter-limits, with the idea of  a constitutional core potentially 
resistant to the idea of  primacy. The second, however, is linked with the use that the 
CJEU has been making of  the internal constitutional singularities of  the Member 
States (defined now as the “constitutional identity”) to modulate the application of  the 
principle of  primacy.  
This European jurisdictional slope of  the constitutional identity in the 
application that the CJEU has done of  Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU may be framed, 
23 Declaration 1/2004, Spanish Constitutional Court, December 13, FJ 4.
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as we see, within the relations of  confluence among legal systems, in the dialectic 
relation between European constitutional law in a strict sense (from the EU) and in 
a broad sense (including the national constitutional systems as well). This way, the 
national constitutional identity operates as a qualified element in the construction of  
the normative sense of  the European norm, that could have a distinct reach if  the 
interpreter would not have the express mandate to consider, precisely, the internal 
constitutional identity. 
A confluence that shows, likewise, on the other side, via the possible 
incorporation of  European law in the internal parameter of  constitutionality, when 
that is proceeding, conforming therefore the other slope of  the dialectic relation 
between the national constitutional law and the Union’s, in the framework of  
European constitutional law. In any case, it is the European law that contributes to 
reconfigure the national constitutional identity in a broad sense. 
The conflictual dimension of  the constitutional identity, on the contrary, refers 
to counter-limits to identify – a constitutional core eventually resistant to European 
law, because it would define the constitutional identity of  the State in a strict sense. 
It is here that problems of  potential tension between European law and internal law 
occur, and where we should seek to value the content of  the constitutional identity 
in a way that allows the recognition of  its condition as “concept of  boarder” that shall 
operate only as last result measure, when the conflict between European law and 
internal constitutional law is unsurmountable. 
The characterization of  what might be considered as an integral part of  the 
“constitutional identity” of  a State, in that strict sense, is not easy. At stake is a concept 
that appeals to a minimum from which there is no derogation possible, reminding us 
other similar notions that, in the Constitution of  pluralism, refer to arbitral spheres 
to characterise what permits to recognise a right (the guarantee of  the essential core 
of  human rights) or an institution (the constitutional guarantees) as such. However, 
those arbitrators do not exist in the relation between European law and internal law, 
because neither the CJEU nor the internal constitutional courts may have a last say 
beyond their specific scope of  decision (European law and internal constitutional law, 
respectively). From this perspective, the CJEU cannot define the ultimate meaning 
of  constitutional identity, since, as we saw, it only resorts to it instrumentally as an 
extra factor to consider in the modulation of  the application of  the principle of  
primacy. However, it can neither attribute to the other part, the internal constitutional 
court, that function because the constitutional identity is a boarder-concept and 
boarders cannot be defined by only one of  the parties. The constitutional courts 
can characterise the constitutional identity for internal purposes but cannot have the 
pretension of  deciding the scope that that definition will have at the European level, 
in accordance with Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU.
Indeed, and considering that the constitutional identity regards the national 
Constitution that may have as “supreme interpreter”, an internal constitutional system 
that has the last word, it is also certain that, since it can operate as a limit to the 
principle of  primacy, it also implies an interpretation of  the scope of  European 
law, which is an attribution of  the CJEU. In this way, there is not an unequivocal 
answer to this question. Therefore, there is not a single jurisdictional entity that 
may establish the last meaning of  constitutional identity as the essential core of  the 
internal legal-constitutional system.
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5. Flexibility and convergence between the national constitutional 
identity and the European one. The example of  Portugal
The concept of  national constitutional identity, in a strict sense, is linked to 
other national sovereignty concepts such as the primary constituent power, material 
limits and constitutional revision power. However, these concepts are precisely the 
ones that most harm suffered due to the process of  supranational integration. The 
supranationally integrated national State is no longer sovereign at the external level 
(it was neither so before, at the internal level, with the adoption of  a normative 
Constitution) and it is not equipped with a primary constituent power as long as 
it is a member of  the European Union. The supranational integration resulted in 
an inevitable fragmentation of  the constituent power24 that must be acknowledged 
while carrying the analysis of  the concept of  constitutional identity. 
The nexus between the concept of  constitutional identity, the constitutional 
revision, and the constituent power places us in a field particularly sensitive and 
unstable because the idea of  constitutional identity is, to some extent, incoherent 
when considering the possibility of  constitutional revisions that inevitably result in 
the transformation of  the Constitution and, therefore, the constitutional identity. 
The existence of  material limits of  revision can neither be considered as an 
unsurmountable obstacle to the constitutional mutation that defines an essential 
core resistant to European law. Firstly, because in several European systems there 
are no stony clauses, and there are even specific provisions on “total revision” of  the 
Constitution, as it is the case of  Spain. But, mainly, because a democratic system 
cannot give away the legitimate constituent power to endow itself  with a new 
constitutional order.  
It is surprising, concerning this issue, the position adopted by the German 
Constitutional Court in Lisboa regarding a possible federal advance of  the European 
integration. Firstly, the material limits of  revision are an entity of  the national State, 
aimed at preventing democratic regressions that have no place in a Member State of  
the European Union. Secondly, the German unification operated in the framework 
of  the German Basic Law, although that implied not less than a modification of  the 
constituent subject without following the procedure set out by Article 146 of  that 
Basic Law, to provide the recently united German people with a new Constitution 
(“Verfassung”).
The Portuguese system offers a very important reference to the actual debate 
on the concept of  constitutional identity, in itself, regarding the process of  European 
integration and Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU. The Portuguese Constitution offers a very 
relevant example of  the relation between Constitutional revision and constitutional 
rupture. The modifications introduced by the subsequent amendments had a wide 
reach but the Portuguese constitutionalists do not doubt that the Constitution of  
1976 is still alive because it keeps the core of  basic principles that a Constitution 
to keep its Constitutional identity. The Portuguese Constitution is a complex work 
resulting, textually, of  a constituent process prolonged in time, with important 
24 See my work, “El status constitucional de la reforma y la fragmentación del Poder Constituyente”, 
in AAVV, La democracia constitucional. Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Rubio Llorente, Congreso de los 
Diputados, Tribunal Constitucional, Vol. I, Madrid (2002) 99-130 and “European Integration and 
Limitation of  the Power of  Constitutional Reform”, in Limitations of  National Sovereignty through 
European Integration, ed. Rainer Arnold (New York: Springer, 2016), 15-25. 
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revisions that did not transform the Portuguese constitutional identity, as states Jorge 
Miranda,25 but rather, completed and fulfilled the constitutional consensus, as Gomes 
Canotilho affirms since the structural principles (rule of  law, democracy, solidarity) 
and the fundamental rights that characterise the constitutional text, the identity of  
the Constitution.26 In the words of  the previous President of  the Constitutional 
Court, Professor Cardoso da Costa, we could talk about a “global constituent process” 
through which a constitutional document stabilized in its characterizing elements 
was gradually carved.27
This admirable lesson from the Portuguese constitutionalism teaches us 
something very important: Constitution and democracy do not have the same 
extension, democracy is more broad than the Constitution and shall remain open to 
the possibility of  revision and change. With the condition, naturally, that what is in 
place is a pluralist democracy in which the essential principles of  the constitutional 
democracy are safeguarded: Rule of  law, controlling majority, protection of  minorities, 
guarantee of  fundamental rights.
This question inevitably leads us to the debate on the concept of  constitutional 
identity that takes place today in Europe involving the constitutional national courts, 
the CJEU itself, and European scholars. As mentioned, not all Constitutions include 
material limits of  revision and it is difficult to articulate within those a definition 
of  constitutional identity. In the Portuguese case, the Constitution has a wide 
catalogue of  contents protected by the “stony clauses” (Article 288 Constitution of  
the Portuguese Republic), but it is also the Constitution in which the norm on the 
material limits of  revision, through a reform of  previous Article 290, was modified, 
without this change affecting the constitutional identity.
Therefore, if  the constitutional identity in its conflictual dimension assumes the 
existence of  an inalienable essential core of  the Constitution, but the Constitution 
admits its complete revision, as is the case in Spain, or made possible the incorporation 
of  a new constituent subject without modifying its identity, as was the case in 
Germany, or modified its own revision limits, as happened in Portugal, in fact, what is 
the constitutional identity of  these countries? In my view, the constitutional identity 
that can be opposed to European integration shall necessarily acknowledge this same 
openness of  the constitutions to revisions or transformation of  the constitutional 
system within a democratic context.
From this perspective, we shall consider, as mentioned before, that pluralist 
democracy and Constitution do not have the same extension always, because 
democracy is always wider than the Constitution. What the constitutional order must 
guarantee is the democratic freedom of  expression, understood in the terms of  
pluralist democracy (with the necessary respect for minorities and the possibility of  
25 “After seven constitutional revisions, after the Portugal’s accession to the Communities and to the European Union, and 
after so many transformations in the country and the world, the Constitution is still the same Constitution that in 1976 
was approved by the Constituent Assembly – because a Constitution is, and this cannot be emphasised strongly enough, 
more a set of  principles and less a set of  provisions.” J. Miranda, “A originalidade e as principais características 
da Constituição Portuguesa”, in Cuestiones Constitucionales, No. 16, January - June 2007, p. 278.
26 See J. Gomes Canotilho, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição, 3ª Ed., (Coimbra: Almedina, 
1998), 203 and ff. “Considered globally, the constitutional compromises made possible a constitutional project that 
has been reasonably capable of  solving the problems raised by the political pluralism, by the social complexity and the 
conflictual democracy. This is the dynamic character that is it the base of  the compromises achieved in the revision sphere”. 
27 See J. Cardoso Da Costa, Prólogo a Javier Tajadura Tejada (Coord.) in La Constitución portuguesa de 1976: 
Un estudio académico treinta años después (Madrid: CEPC, 2006), XX. 
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reversion of  political options to make alternative governance possible). It is precisely 
the pluralist democracy that may be essentially identified with the constitutional 
identity and contrarily to concrete contents of  the legal-constitutional system 
that mark the border of  constitutional identity, in light of  a European law that, in 
principle, shares these values and must safeguard them within the European Union, 
even when regressionist attitudes from Member States take place.28
Beyond the potential conflictual dimension of  the national constitutional 
identity, we can also extract from the Portuguese Constitutional system, a relevant 
criterion regarding the convergence between the national constitutional identity and 
the European common identity. We can find it in the doctrine of  the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court regarding the measure taken to tackle the economic crisis 
adopted to apply European policies. Indeed, the Court established a criterion that 
I think particularly relevant regarding the necessary accordance between European 
law and internal constitutional law considering the essential core of  principles 
that configure the rule of  law, in terms of  the European common constitutional 
patrimony.
This way, the constitutional principles that the Court uses to declare the 
unconstitutionality of  those measures are considered, also, as principles that bind in 
the same way the European Union: “for that matter, in this domain, there is no divergence 
between EU law and Portuguese Constitutional law. Indeed, the constitutional principles of  
equality, proportionality, and protection of  legitimate expectations that have served as parameters, 
for the Constitutional Court, to assess the constitutionality of  the national norms on issues like those 
brought by these proceedings, are part of  the hard-core of  a rule of  law, integrating the European 
common legal patrimony to which the Union is also subject to”.29
In short, it is necessary to appeal to the flexibility of  the national conflictual 
identity, in the tension with the European constitutional identity, within the 
framework of  European Constitutional law, to avoid the occurrence of  artificial 
conflicts between the internal legal system and the European one, based on a rigid 
understanding of  the concept of  constitutional identity. The Europeist protection of  
the internal constitutional systems shall not have the additional limits of  the internal 
ones: only the ones of  the pluralist democracy. 
The dialectic interaction between the national constitutional identity and the 
European one, in the framework of  European Constitutional Law (this is, between 
its strict and broader sense) is also a factor of  common identity development that 
28 Something that is has not be done effectively in practice, if  we consider the case of  Poland and 
Hungary, A different issue, that we cannot develop here, is if  the constitutional identity of  some 
Member States, as it is the case of  Portugal, Spain, Italy or Greece was respected by the European 
entities since the economic crisis started. This is, if  we can still talk about of  an authentic pluralist 
democracy in the context of  an economic interpretation of  the Constitution that was imposed all 
over Europe, and to which a constitutional interpretation of  the crisis shall have been opposed to. 
See, on this issue, my work, “El final de una época dorada. Una reflexión sobre la crisis económica 
y el declive del Derecho constitucional nacional”, in Estudos em Homenagem ao Professor Doutor José 
Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, Constituição e Estado: entre Teoria e Dogmática, Vol. II, (Coimbra: 
Coimbra Editora, 2012) 99-122. And “Crisi economica e crisi costituzionale in Europa” in 
KorEuropa, No. 1/2012, “Crise économique et crise constitutionnelle en Europe”, in Constitutions: 
Revue de droit constitutionnel appliqué, April-June 2013, “Crisis económica y crisis constitucional 
en Europa”, in Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, No. 98, May/August 2013 and also “Una 
interpretación constitucional de la crisis económica”, in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, Year 
10, No. 19, January-June 2013,  http://www.ugr.es/~redce. 
29 Judgment of  the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of  14th August 2014, nº. 574/2014. para. 12.
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contributes to the progress of  European Constitutional Law itself. From this open 
and flexible understanding of  the national constitutional identity, we may build 
convergence processes, both in the European and national spheres, that favour the 
evolution in Europeist terms of  the national constitutional law and the progressive 
transformation in constitutional terms of  the European legal system.
